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REFORMING TORT REFORM: IS THERE
SUBSTANCE TO THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT?
To date, the United States Supreme Court has artfully avoided any pro-
nouncement of what substantive jury functions are "preserved" by the right
to trial by jury in suits at common law, as guaranteed by the seventh amend-
ment to the Constitution.' In general terms, the Court has spoken grandly
of the seventh amendment as a "fundamental guarantee of the rights and
liberties of the people,"' of which "any seeming curtailment ... should be
scrutinized with the utmost care."3 However, the Court has yet to define in
specific terms which substantive functions are so inherent to trial by jury, so
elementary and necessary, that the seventh amendment preserves them from
judicial or legislative encroachment. The Court's pronouncements concern-
ing inherent jury functions speak to procedure only: a jury of six persons is
constitutionally permissible;4 unanimity of verdict is required;5 and disputed
questions of fact must be submitted to the jury.6 Most notable, however, is
the Court's failure to define in clear terms what constitutes a disputed "ques-
tion of fact," upon which a jury must rule in the absence of a waiver of a
litigant's seventh amendment rights.
In the modern era of "tort reform," this uncertainty has raised the ques-
tion of whether legislatures may properly apply limitations in the form of
1. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
3. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
4. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973) (criticizing Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (stating that the seventh amendment requires a jury of 12)); see also
infra note 155.
5. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897); see also Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1916); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900), overruled
on other grounds, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343,
346-47 (1898), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Springville
v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 708 (1897).
6. Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 321 (1885) (stating that trial of issues of
fact without the intervention of a jury is permissible only where the parties waive their right to
jury trial); see also Hodges, 106 U.S. at 412 ("It was the province of the jury to pass upon the
issues of fact, and the right of the defendants to have this done is secured by the Constitution
of the United States.").
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"damage caps" to the amount of damages a tort plaintiff may recover with-
out intruding upon the function of the jury as trier of fact. Stated differently,
the question is whether imposition of damage caps violates the doctrine of
separation of powers as impermissible legislative interference with the func-
tion of the judiciary.7
Underlying this central issue is the question of whether legislative empow-
erment to create and abolish causes of action equates to an unlimited license
to modify common law causes of action, or whether the seventh amendment
constitutionally limits such power in some fashion. If the legislative power is
so limited, it raises a further question concerning the manner and extent of
such limitation. If the legislative power is not so limited, it is necessary to
question what procedural devices may be used in applying these damage-
limiting provisions. As of January 1989, such damage-limiting provisions, in
one form or another, were in effect in at least seventeen states.' The Amicus
Curiae Committee of The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)
recently indicated that it intends to challenge damage caps based upon the
7. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986), recon. denied, 672 F.
Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987), appealfiled, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1988). In
Boyd, Judge Michael saw the question of the extent of a plaintiff's injury, hence the damages to
which he is entitled, as a question of fact reserved to the sound discretion of the jury. Id. at
788. The court held that the Virginia legislature's imposition of a medical malpractice damage
cap, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Supp. 1988), intruded upon this function and thus vio-
lated the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at
790.
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-3 (1975 & Supp. 1988) (future damages greater than
$150,000 structured); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (1986 & Supp. 1988) ($500,000
noneconomic damages, all tort actions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3) (1973 & Supp.
1987) (generally $250,000 noneconomic damages, all tort actions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6864 (Supp. 1988) (medical malpractice damages to be paid in form of structured annuity);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Supp. 1988) ($400,000 noneconomic damages, all tort actions); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983) ($500,000 total recovery, medical malpractice actions);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1299.42 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) (limiting recoverable damages
to $500,000 medical malpractice cases); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109 (Supp.
1988) ($350,000 noneconomic damages, all tort actions); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.210(1)
(Vernon 1988) ($350,000 noneconomic damages from any one defendant, medical malpractice
actions); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (Supp. 1983) ($250,000 noneconomic damages,
medical malpractice actions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978 & Supp. 1986) ($500,000 total
medical malpractice recovery, exclusive of punitive damages and previously incurred medical
expenses); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page Supp. 1981) ($200,000 total medical mal-
practice recovery where no death results); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1987) ($500,000
noneconomic damages, all tort actions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987)
($1,000,000 total medical malpractice recovery); UrAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1953)
($250,000 noneconomic damages, medical malpractice actions); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15
(Supp. 1988) ($1,000,000 total recovery, medical malpractice actions); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.56.250(d)(2) (1987) (noneconomic damages subject to formula limitation, all tort actions).
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seventh amendment or comparable state jury trial provisions,9 thus guaran-
teeing repeated litigation of these questions in various jurisdictions in the
immediate and foreseeable future.
Because the Supreme Court has held that the seventh amendment does
not apply to the states,' 0 the question of whether the seventh amendment
bars damage caps might appear to be confined to federal law or those cases
which find their way into the federal courts. The constitutions of 48 states,
however, have civil jury trial provisions roughly analogous in form and sub-
stance to the seventh amendment.1I These state jury trial provisions are
thus amenable to seventh amendment analysis. 2
This Comment examines the scope of legislative power in light of seventh
amendment jurisprudence as it directly applies to the federal government
and, by analogy, to the states. In addition to examining the historical con-
text and purposes of the seventh amendment, this Comment explores, in re-
lation to the seventh amendment, the power of legislatures to modify, as
opposed to the power to create or abolish, common law forms of action.
Next, this Comment examines the applicability of the seventh amendment to
statutory and treaty-created damage-limiting provisions, statutory provi-
sions that create civil penalties, and the various procedural devices by which
a damage award is judicially determined, altered or foreclosed. Finally, this
9. White, 'Tort Reform'and State Constitutional Rights, ATLA ADVOCATE, Aug. 1988,
at 2; see also Blum, Tort Reform's Next Wave, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
10. Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (citing Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 532, 557 (1874)).
11. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; CONN. CONST. art I, § 19; DEL. CONST.
art. 1, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 11; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 13;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20; IOWA CONST. art.
I § 9; KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights § 5; Ky. CONST. § 242; ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; MD.
CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 23; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 15: MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31; MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art.
20; N.J. CONST. art. I, 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR.
CONST. art. VII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 9.
12. Seventh amendment analysis applies directly to those common law claims based upon
state law which are litigated in the federal courts under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); see also Necaise v.
Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 1964); Chatzicharalambus v. Petit, 73 F.R.D. 417
(E.D. La. 1977). Seventh amendment jurisprudence, though not directly binding upon state
court actions, O'Connor v. Nevada, 507 F. Supp. 546 (D. Nev. 1981), aff'd. 686 F.2d 749 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982), may nonetheless constitute persuasive authority for
interpretation of analogous state jury trial provisions.
1989]
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Comment concludes that reserving to the jury the determination of the
quantum of damages in a common law action is the historically correct in-
terpretation of the seventh amendment, and that judicial cognizance of a
legislative power to limit the function of the jury in such an action by impos-
ing damage caps is ill-founded and offensive to the letter, the spirit, the pur-
pose, and the meaning of the seventh amendment.
I. INSURING THE INSURERS
The past fifteen years have seen the birth and continuance of a perceived
"insurance crisis" which threatens the availability of essential health serv-
ices. 3 Some health care providers, in response to increasing premiums for
malpractice insurance, have either discontinued or threatened to discontinue
particularly high-risk medical services such as obstetrics and emergency
medicine.' 4 Insurers argue that an explosion in tort litigation, marked by
geometric increases both in the number of cases filed and in the amounts of
damages awarded, underlies the crisis and makes increases in insurance pre-
miums necessary.15 Accordingly, the insurers have vigorously lobbied legis-
latures for packages of alterations to state tort laws which generically come
under the heading of "tort reform."' 6
The provisions falling within the realm of tort reform include shortening
statutes of limitation,' 7 limiting or eliminating minority status or other disa-
bilities that toll the running of such statutes,' 8 creating medical malpractice
review panels which screen or arbitrate medical malpractice claims,' 9 creat-
ing state-operated excess insurance funds,2" modifying or eliminating collat-
13. See generally Barrett, Tort Reform Fight Shifts to State Courts, Wall St. I., Sept. 19,
1988, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
14. See id. An assessment of the merits of competing claims regarding the existence of
such an "insurance crisis," or the decrease in or lack of certain services in response to this
.crisis," is beyond the scope of this Comment.
15. Id.
16. See generally Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort
Reform in An Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401 (1988); American Bar Association
Mid-year Meeting, 55 U.S.L.W. 2450 (Feb. 24, 1987).
17. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) (instituting a two-year statute of limita-
tions coupled with four-year statute of repose in medical malpractice cases).
18. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17(b) (1983) (eliminating minority status as a circum-
stance which tolls the running of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions).
Formerly, North Carolina followed the general rule holding that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run against the claim of an infant plaintiff until he or she reaches the age of
majority. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229 A. 1. (Supp. 1988) (statute of limitations does not
run against claim of infant or incompetent).
19. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984).
20. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1988).
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eral source rules,2' modifying or eliminating rules pertaining to joint and
several liability,2 2 prohibiting a plaintiff from demanding or suggesting a dol-
lar amount in the ad damnum clause of his complaint,2 3 requiring damage
awards in excess of a statutory amount to be paid in the form of a structured
annuity, 4 and limiting the amount of damages that a fact-finder may
award.2 5 Within this latter category, "damage caps" fall into three basic
subcategories: across-the-board limitations on the total recovery permissible
in certain tort actions, usually medical malpractice;2 6 limitations upon the
amount of noneconomic damages which may be awarded in such actions;27
and limitations upon noneconomic damages which a jury may award in any
tort action.28 As of January 1989, at least seventeen states provided for
some form of limitation on recoverable tort damages, of which at least nine
apply only to medical malpractice claims.
29
Since the introduction of damage caps in the 1970's, victims of grievous
torts, through their attorneys, have vigorously assailed such limitations in
the courts, basing their arguments on federal due process,3" equal protec-
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7372 (1987) (applying to motor vehicle personal
injury or wrongful death claims only). Under the traditional "collateral source" rule, evidence
of compensation a plaintiff had received, or which was paid on his behalf, from collateral
sources such as medical or disability insurance, workers' compensation, or employment or
social welfare benefits, was inadmissible and such payments could not be used to offset the
pecuniary liability of a defendant. By statute, some jurisdictions have provided for the admis-
sion of such evidence and the deduction of such payments from a plaintiff's award of damages.
While this obviously avoids the possibility of "double recovery" on the part of a plaintiff, it
creates a possibility of inadequate recovery unless accompanied by legislation which bars the
subrogation claims of such collateral sources. Otherwise, a plaintiff may have his award re-
duced by the amount already paid by an insurer only to have the insurer then demand reim-
bursement from the damage award.
22. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983) (limiting exposure of each joint
tortfeasor in medical malpractice cases to $100,000, regardless of the size of the overall award).
23. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7 (1987) (medical malpractice complaint may
demand "reasonable damages" only).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (Supp. 1988).
25. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987) ($1,000,000 total available re-
covery in medical malpractice cases).
26. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Supp. 1988) ($1,000,000, permissible recov-
ery in medical malpractice cases).
27. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1953) ($250,000, noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions).
28. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109 (Supp. 1988) ($350,000 limi-
tation on noneconomic damages in tort actions).
29. See supra note 8.
30. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (holding that due process is not offended so
long as the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest); Jones v. State
Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (rejecting argument that due process
requires a quid pro quo where a right enjoyed at common law is legislatively abolished), cert.
1989]
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tion,3' and seventh amendment grounds,32 as well as on state constitutional
provisions.3 3 To date, the highest courts of five states have upheld such stat-
utory caps34 while nine have stricken them as unconstitutional.3" Until re-
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), on remand, Nos. 55,527, 55,586 (4th Dist. Idaho Nov. 3, 1980)
(see also infra note 46 and accompanying text discussing quid pro quo); Prendergast v. Nelson,
199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (submission of medical malpractice claims to review
panel as prerequisite to proceeding in the courts bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest and does not deny the plaintiff due process or equal protection); State ex reL
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (procedural due process not
offended by delay occasioned by mandatory submission of plaintiff's claim to medical malprac-
tice review panel before proceeding in the courts).
31. See cases cited supra note 30; see also Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988);
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H.
925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Eliza-
beth Med. Ctr., Inc., 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1976). The argu-
ment commonly advanced is that the classification under which medical malpractice plaintiffs
are treated differently from other tort plaintiffs violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment or state equal protection provisions.
32. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (1986), recon. denied, 672 F. Supp. 915
(W.D. Va. 1987), appealfiled, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1988). Courts have
invalidated damage caps on the basis of equal protection, due process, or on state constitu-
tional grounds. See Jones, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399; Hoem, 756 P.2d 780; Carson, 120 N.H.
925, 424 A.2d 825; Arneson, 270 N.W.2d 125; Simon 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903. See
also cases cited infra note 33. However, plaintiffs have argued, with little success, that
mandatory submission of a plaintiff's claim to a medical malpractice review or arbitration
panel before the plaintiff may proceed in the courts constitutes a denial of the plaintiff's right
to trial by jury. See Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 97, 256 N.W.2d at 657 (panel review upheld);
Johnson, 273 Ind. at 374, 404 N.E.2d at 585 (same); Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 491, 261
N.W.2d at 434 (same). But see Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 I11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976) (empowerment of review panel to make conclusions of law and fact held an uncon-
stitutional intrusion into the function of the judiciary; hence, mandatory submission of a plain-
tiff's claim to such a panel denied plaintiff's right to trial by jury as secured by the state
constitution); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 125 (holding that statutory provision requiring medical
malpractice plaintiff to proceed in a separate non-jury action against the state patient trust
fund, where he seeks to recover sums in excess of a defendant's maximum statutory liability
limit of $100,000, violative of state constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury).
Boyd marks the first case in which the argument was successfully raised that determination
of the quantum of a plaintiff's damages is a question of fact reserved to the sound discretion of
the jury. 647 F. Supp. at 788. As of January, 1989, it is the only federal decision addressing
the constitutionality of medical malpractice damage caps. The court based its finding upon
both seventh amendment jurisprudence and the civil jury trial provision of the Virginia Consti-
tution, which it found to be at least as expansive as that of the seventh amendment. Id. at 789.
33. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Kansas Malpractice
Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988); White v. State, 203 Mont. 363,
661 P.2d 1272 (1983); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 125; Carson, 120 N.H. at 925, 424 A.2d at 825.
34. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 137, 695 P.2d at 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (no violation of
equal protection or due process where California statute is rationally related to legitimate state
interest; tort victim has no basic property right in a particular measure of damages); Johnson,
273 Ind. at 374, 404 N.E.2d at 585 (no violation of equal protection, due process, right to trial
by jury, or Indiana Constitution's "open courts" provision); Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 97, 256
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cently, attacks upon damage caps as violative of federal or state jury trial
provisions have centered upon state medical malpractice review panels and
the requirement that a plaintiff argue his claim before such a panel before
proceeding in court.36 These attacks have largely been unsuccessful.3"
However, in 1986, Boyd v. Bulala,3 s a Virginia federal trial court opinion,
recognized a new line of argument which the plaintiffs' bar has found appeal-
ing.3 9 Boyd held that the determination of the quantum of damages in a tort
action is a question of fact inherently within the province of the jury and
thus falls within the protection of the seventh amendment or comparable
state jury trial provisions.4" This holding inevitably leads to the corollary
N.W.2d at 657 (Nebraska statutory classification of medical malpractice plaintiffs not discrimi-
natory where it may be reasonably justified by any conceivable set of facts); Strykowski, 81
Wis. 2d at 491, 261 N.W.2d at 434 (no violation of equal protection or procedural due process;
Wisconsin statute did not create unlawful delegation of judicial authority and did not impair
right to trial by jury); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). See also
infra note 40.
35. As of February 1989, the nine states whose highest courts have struck down damage
caps are Florida, Kansas, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas,
and Wyoming. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Bell, 243 Kan. at
333, 757 P.2d at 251 (due process requires right to remedy; quid pro quo necessary where
remedy is limited by Kansas statute); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d
399 (1976) (statutory classification treating medical malpractice plaintiffs differently from
other tort plaintiffs bears no fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate state objective),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), on remand, Nos. 55,527, 55,586 (4th Dist. Idaho Nov. 3,
1980); Wright, 63 111. 2d at 313, 347 N.E.2d at 736 (legislation constituted a special law in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution); White, 203 Mont. at 363,
661 P.2d at 1272 (limitation of liability of state or subdivisions thereof to economic damages of
$300,000 held violative of Montana Constitution's guarantee of remedy for every injury); Car-
son, 120 N.H. at 925, 424 A.2d at 825 (classification limiting rights of medical malpractice
plaintiffs not substantially related to legitimate governmental interest as required by New
Hampshire constitution); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 125 (medical malpractice limitations arbi-
trary and violative of North Dakota Constitution's due process provision); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d
at 687 (legislation violative of Texas "open courts" constitutional provision); Hoem, 756 P.2d
at 780 (medical malpractice legislation violative of Wyoming equal protection guarantee; not
rationally related to legitimate state interest).
Additionally, damage caps have been invalidated at the trial court level in two other states.
See Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 781 (quantum of damages is a question of fact reserved to the jury;
damage-limiting provision constitutes impermissible legislative intrusion into jury function in
violation of the seventh amendment and jury trial provision of Virginia Constitution); Simon, 3
Ohio Op. 3d at 164, 355 N.E.2d at 903 (damage limitation violative of state and federal equal
protection guarantees; compulsory arbitration requirement violates right to trial by jury).
36. See cases cited supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), recon. denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987),
appealfiled, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1988).
39. See sources cited supra note 9.
40. While Boyd is presently on appeal and thus of questionable vitality, its analysis and
arguments are likely to be raised again in other jurisdictions in the months and years to come.
Id. This is especially so in light of the recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Ether-
1989]
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that legislative attempts to limit damage awards violate the jury trial provi-
sion in question and are impermissible.
The counterargument denies that the determination of the amount of
damages is inherently a jury function preserved by the seventh amendment
or comparable state provision.4 It asserts, and at least one court has agreed,
that legislatures may limit recoverable damages in such a fashion while re-
taining the common law nature of the plaintiff's cause of action.42 Propo-
nents of this view correctly point out that other statutory compensation
schemes, such as workers' compensation statutes;43 the Price-Anderson
Act,44 which sets a cap on recoverable damages arising from nuclear acci-
dents; and certain treaties,45 contain damage limitations. The Supreme
Court has left unresolved a collateral question: whether a legislature must
provide a quid pro quo 46 when it seeks to limit recoverable damages in a
idge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989), which upheld the Virginia medical
malpractice damage cap, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Supp. 1988) against various chal-
lenges to its constitutionality - including the challenge sustained in Boyd. Bearing in mind
that state jury trial provisions govern trials in state courts while the seventh amendment gov-
erns trials in federal courts, this decision does not insulate Virginia's damage cap from the
challenge presented in Boyd. While the Virginia Supreme Court has held that it does not
offend Virginia's jury trial provision, VA. CONST. art. I, § 10, it does not necessarily follow that
it is inoffensive to the seventh amendment. If so found, i.e. if Boyd is affirmed in its present
appeal, the result would be that the Virginia damage cap applies only in cases brought in state
courts and is inapplicable to those brought in the federal courts under diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. Such an anomalous result might inspire the U.S. Supreme Court to address the
subject.
41. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 11-15, Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va.
1987), Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. filed Mar. 1, 1988).
42. See, e.g., Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) (damage cap
for injuries sustained in international air travel imposed by legislative adoption of treaty [War-
saw Convention] not offensive to seventh amendment).
43. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 9, Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987),
Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. filed Mar. 1, 1988) (citing New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
45. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1982, adhered to by United States, June 27, 1934, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. following § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]; Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Agreement No. CAB 18,900, approved by Order No. E-28,680, May 13, 1966
(CAB Docket 17,325), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. following § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter Montreal
Agreement].
Because the Montreal Agreement amends and supplements the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, the two are generally read together. References herein to the Warsaw Convention
should be read, unless otherwise distinguished, to refer to the Warsaw Convention as supple-
mented by the Montreal Agreement.
46. The concept of quid pro quo was first introduced in New York Cent. R.R. Co. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In upholding the New York state workmen's compensation law,
which abrogated the common law of torts with regard to certain job-related injuries in favor of
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common law right of action47 or replace the action with a statutory compen-
sation scheme.4"
Finally, various procedural devices place the determination of the quan-
tum of damages within the discretion of the court or remove the damage
issue from a jury's consideration altogether. These devices include default
judgment,4 9 remittitur as a condition of denial of motion for new trial,5"
assessment of civil penalties provided by statute,5 directed verdict,5 2 and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.5" The mere fact that these proce-
a statutory compensation scheme, the Court stated: "[lilt perhaps may be doubted whether the
State could abolish all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without
setting up something adequate in their stead." Id. at 201. The White Court did not resolve the
question of whether such a quid pro quo is constitutionally required where common law rights
are abrogated by statute, nor has it been resolved to date. See Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). Within the context of damage caps, plain-
tiffs continue to make the argument that a quid pro quo is required; lower courts have divided
on the subject. See infra note 109.
The most common of such statutes in derogation of common law rights are those involving
workers' compensation, whereby an employer is strictly liable for job-related injuries and may
not raise the traditional tort defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or the
"fellow servant" rule. See, e.g., White, 243 U.S. at 193. The injured employee, on the other
hand, is limited in his recovery to compensation set forth by statute. Id. Whether required or
not, the quid pro quo is present where the employee is guaranteed a reasonable, albeit limited,
recovery. In return for such limitation, the employee need not affirmatively prove negligence
on the part of the employer, nor may the employer avail himself of the traditional negligence
defenses.
It appears entirely plausible that the reason the Court has not decided whether a quid pro
quo is constitutionally required is that most, if not all, statutes which abrogate common law
rights of recovery in tort contain such a quid pro quo, usually in the form of strict liability or
guarantee of recovery. Thus, the Court has not had to address the question. See infra notes
103-09 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the necessity of a quid pro quo in the context of medical malprac-
tice damage caps, see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 157-58, 695 P.2d
665, 679-80, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-83, (holding that a quid pro quo is not constitutionally
required), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 519-20, 261 N.W.2d 434, 447-48 (1978) (same); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 120,
256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977) (same); cf Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 943, 424 A.2d 825,
838 (1980) (holding that quid pro quo is constitutionally required).
48. See Fein, 474 U.S. at 892-95 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that this question, which
was left open in the Court's decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978), presented a substantial federal question which should be resolved by the Court,
thus justifying retention of Court's jurisdiction); see also infra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text.
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1935).
51. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982) (granting Administrator
of Environmental Protection Agency authority to assess penalties for water pollution
violations).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a); see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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dures exist within the scheme of federal civil procedure arguably strengthens
the argument that jury determination of damages in common law actions is
not so firmly entrenched in seventh amendment jurisprudence as to be invio-
late. Proponents of damage caps may argue that a legislature's election to
limit recoverable damages to promote what it deems to be a valuable social
end is yet another instance where the seventh amendment does not require a
jury trial. Damage cap proponents may even argue that the right of trial by
jury does not encompass a jury determination of the quantum of damages in
any instance; thus, the determination may be removed from a jury's consid-
eration at the whim of the legislature.
II. "IN SUITS AT COMMON LAW... THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY
SHALL BE PRESERVED.",
5 4
The seventh amendment is unique in that, by its use of the term "pre-
served," it incorporates an external body of law governing trial by jury that
existed at some time in the past. The Supreme Court has held that the term
"preserved" refers to the "substance of right to a jury trial which existed
under English common law when the amendment was adopted."5 5 Thus,
whether a legislature may constitutionally limit the amount of damages that
may be awarded in a common law action depends on whether jury assess-
ment of the quantum of damages in a tort action was part of the "substance"
of English common law in 1791 and, if so, whether it was intended to be
preserved by the enactment of the seventh amendment.
Assessment of the quantum of damages as a function of the jury in actions
at law was deeply entrenched in the common law of England at the time the
seventh amendment was adopted.56 The common law required a jury to
assess a plaintiff's damages whenever the amount sued for was an unliqui-
dated or uncertain sum. 57 "But the interlocutory judgments, most usually
spoken of, are those incomplete judgments, whereby the right of the plaintiff
is indeed established, but the quantum of damages sustained by him is not
ascertained: which is a matter that cannot be done without the intervention
of a jury."5 8
With few exceptions, 59 the main text of the Constitution secures no indi-
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
55. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.) (citing Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
56. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto
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vidual rights or liberties, but focuses upon defining the powers of govern-
ment. The failure of the Constitutional Convention to include a bill of rights
caused the anti-federalists to view the Constitution as pernicious and to op-
pose its ratification.' The anti-federalist arguments opposing ratification of
the Constitution emphasized its failure to provide for a right to a civil jury
trial.6 The circumvention of the civil jury trial by the early colonial admin-
istrators' extensive use of vice-admiralty courts, one of the specific griev-
ances enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,6 2 undoubtedly
figured in the anti-federalists' concerns.
The colonists' insistence upon a right to a civil jury trial stems from a
belief that occasionally judges and juries reach different results.6" Certainly
a jury, applying the proper rule of law, could serve as a check on a corrupt
judge who may apply an improper rule. While this checking power is the
only justification for a civil jury trial that Alexander Hamilton found persua-
sive,' there is evidence that the anti-federalists contemplated, at least in the
context of cases of oppressive taxation, that a jury could step beyond the
black-letter rule of law and serve as a check upon oppressive legislation.65
Put another way, a jury could, in appropriate circumstances, properly disre-
gard the law in arriving at its determination. The anti-federalists, who were
largely responsible for the implementation of the seventh amendment, did
not contemplate that the civil jury trial provided a procedurally efficient
means of resolving disputes and did not intend that it do SO. 6 6 Instead, the
anti-federalists envisioned that a civil jury trial would function primarily to
reach results which a judge could not or would not reach.6 7
laws; general prohibition against suspending writ of habeas corpus); id. art. I, § 10 (prohibition
against impairment of contracts); id. art. III, § 2 (criminal trial provisions); id. art. III, § 3
(provisions concerning treason; prohibition of "corruption of blood"); id. art. IV, § 2 (inter-
state privileges & immunities clause).
60. See Wolfram, A Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 667-70 (1973); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 342 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
61. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Wolfram, supra note 60,
at 667-73.
62. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see also Parklane, 439 U.S. at
340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. See Wolfram, supra note 60, at 671.
64. Id. at 709-10 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 563-64 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961)).
65. Id. at 705-08.
66. Id. at 671. "The inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because in im-
portant instances, through its ability to disregard substantive rules of law, a jury would reach a
result that the judge could not or would not reach." Id.
67. Professor Wolfram sets forth as a secondary reason for the anti-federalists' support of
the seventh amendment the necessity that jurors observe the demeanor of witnesses in the
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The Bill of Rights68 was introduced into the first Congress in 1789.69 The
seventh amendment became law on December 15, 1791. While the Supreme
Court has held that the seventh amendment is not binding upon the states,7 °
almost all states have comparable constitutional provisions for jury trial in
civil matters.7' These state provisions generally fall into three categories.
Most clearly analogous to the seventh amendment, insofar as they refer to a
body of law existing at the time of their adoption, are those which mandate
that the right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate.",72 While less clearly
analogous, the two remaining characterizations, that the right of trial by jury
"shall be inviolate,",73 and that this right "is held to be sacred,",74 are also
susceptible to seventh amendment analysis to the extent that the analysis
addresses the substance of what constitutes trial by jury.
In federal courts, the right of trial by jury prevails in actions at, or analo-
gous to, common law based upon diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, state
law to the contrary notwithstanding. 7' Further, the right to a jury trial may
extend to causes of action created by statute if the causes of action are analo-
gous to actions at common law as they were known in 1791,76 or if the
statute expressly or impliedly provides the right.7 7
III. "[J]URIES MUST ANSWER TO QUESTIONS OF FACT AND JUDGES TO
QUESTIONS OF LAW.",
7 8
Until the perceived insurance crisis of recent times, no one has seriously
suggested that assessment of the amount of a plaintiff's damages in a com-
taking of testimony, observing that, at least in the chancery courts of the day, much testimony
was taken in the form of deposition. Id. at 671 n.86.
68. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
69. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (citing Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 532 (1874)); see also Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 34 (1890), overruled on
other grounds, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
71. See supra note 11. All states, with the exception of Colorado and Louisiana, have
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a civil jury trial.
72. See, e.g., WiS. CONST. art. I, § 7; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
73. See, e.g., OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 19 ("shall be and remain inviolate"); S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 14 ("shall be preserved inviolate").
74. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 12 ("ought to be held sacred"); VA. CONST. art. I, § II
(same).
75. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); see also Necaise v. Chrysler Corp., 335
F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1964); Burcham v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1954);
Chatzicharalambus v. Petit, 73 F.R.D. 417 (E.D. La. 1977).
76. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1974); see also Goar v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. See Sibley v. Fulton Dekalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 832 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 46 (5th ed. 1979) ("[Aid questionemfacti non respondent
judices ... ad questionem juris non respondent juratores." E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE
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mon law action is anything but a question for the jury or that plaintiffs
should be required to forego full compensation for their injuries for a public
policy reason. The central issue is whether the seventh amendment affirma-
tively bars statutes limiting recoverable damages as an intrusion upon this
jury function. Because "the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic
institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements," 79 the pivotal
question is whether assessment of the quantum of damages in a common law
action is such a "fundamental element."
A. How far is "not far enough?"
The proponents of tort reform make the strongest argument that the de-
termination of the quantum of damages in a common law action is an inher-
ent part of the seventh amendment, not in what they say, but in what they
do not say. With rare exception, tort reform proponents still do not contend
that the damage determination presents anything but a jury question except
in those few instances where a legislature has chosen to impose a damage
limitation. The premise that legislatures are so empowered necessarily un-
derlies thig position.
Even conceding that legislatures enjoy broad powers to amend or alter
common law forms of action, it does not necessarily follow that such power
is unlimited or that the mere imposition of a damage cap suffices to remove
the question of damages from the jury's consideration."° The seventh
amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in "suits at common law." In
determining whether a suit is one at common law, or analogous thereto, the
Supreme Court has held that "the nature of the issue to be tried" controls. 8
In cases where the question of a litigant's right to a jury trial arises, courts
must look to the nature of the remedy sought in reaching their determina-
tion.8" If common law, as it existed in 1791, provided the remedy sought,
the seventh amendment guarantees the litigant the right to trial by jury.83 If
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, L.2, C. 12, § 234 (Gryphon Editions, Ltd.,
reproduction 1985)(18th ed. 1823)).
79. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
80. See, e.g., Sibley, 677 F.2d at 833-34 (seventh amendment requires that right of trial by
jury be preserved in statutory cause of action where the claim involves rights and remedies of
the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law).
81. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
82. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
83. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 477 (1830) ("In a just sense, the [sev-
enth] amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and
admiralty jurisdiction .... ), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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equity or admiralty provided the remedy sought, the seventh amendment
does not apply.84
Thus, for seventh amendment purposes, a minor alteration to a common
law form of action generally fails to alter that action to the extent that it
loses its common law character and falls beyond the scope of the seventh
amendment.85 So long as the underlying remedy was cognizable at common
law, the seventh amendment continues to apply. This leads inevitably to the
question of how far a legislature must go in altering a common law form of
action before seventh amendment constraints upon the legislative power
cease to apply. Where the legislative action in question is the mere imposi-
tion of a damage cap, the question is reduced to one of whether the legisla-
ture has effectively transmuted the nature of the issue from one cognizable at
common law to one alien to the courts of 1791. Proponents of broad legisla-
tive power to impose damage caps have looked to United States Supreme
Court dictum for support.
The Supreme Court has stated in support of the right of a legislature to
alter tenets of the common law that "[a] person has no property, no vested
interest, in any rule of the common law ... but the law itself, as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at the will, or even the whim, of the Legisla-
ture."86 Some lower courts have read this language expansively as implying
an almost unlimited legislative empowerment to alter common law rights of
action and, specifically, to enact damage-limiting statutes in common law
tort actions.8 7 These courts, however, have extracted the language in ques-
tion from a narrow quotation in Munn v. Illinois,88 a case dealing with a
84. Ross, 396 U.S. at 533 (quoting Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447).
85. See Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915, 921 (W.D. Va. 1987), appealfiled, Nos. 88-
2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1988).
86. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
87. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 386, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593-94
(1980) (relying upon Munn in holding that the legislature may modify a common law right of
action by imposition of a medical malpractice damage cap); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 106, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663 (1977) (equating the right of a legislature to create or abolish
common law forms of action with a right to modify such rights); see also Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 869, 555 P.2d 399, 409 (1976) (citing Munn but questioning the
efficacy of Idaho's medical malpractice damage cap in equal protection terms and remanding
for further findings of fact), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), on remand, Nos. 55,527, 55,586
(4th Dist. Idaho Nov. 3, 1980) (declaring damage cap unconstitutional).
88. 94 U.S. at 134:
But a mere common-law regulation of trade or business may be changed by statute.
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is
only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights
of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away with-
out due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will,
or even at the whim of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are
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legislature's power to regulate rates at public grain warehouses - an eco-
nomic regulation far removed from seventh amendment considerations.
Read in context, the Court's language does not appear to support a reading
so expansive as to justify limiting jury consideration of the quantum of dam-
ages in a common law action.89 Despite lower courts' reliance upon the
central portion of the quote to find such justification, nothing in the Supreme
Court's subsequent treatment of the language indicates its approval of such
an expansive interpretation. 9' As a result, those who rely upon this "Munn
misconception" do so on a questionable and perhaps misguided basis. A
more thorough examination of legislative empowerment reveals less exten-
sive legislative authority.
A legislature may undoubtedly abolish a common law form of action and
replace it with a compensation scheme or other statutory remedy. 9' Simi-
larly, a legislature may define or abolish legal duties or defenses,92 allocate
burdens of proof among litigants, 93 create or abolish presumptions,94 and
developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. To limit the
rate of charge for services rendered in a public employment, or for the use of prop-
erty in which the public has an interest, is only changing a regulation which existed
before. It establishes no new principle in the law, but only gives a new effect to an old
one.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (federal policy historically favors jury
trials).
90. The central portion of the Munn quote has been cited in three majority opinions. In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the passage was
quoted in support of the premise that the "Constitution does not forbid the creation of new
rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object." Id. at 88 n.32 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929)). This
premise obviously does not address the question of modification of existing common law rights.
The Munn quote was also cited in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912), in
construing the constitutionality of a workers' compensation program, see supra note 46 and
accompanying text, and in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532-33 (1884), holding that a
California statute that permitted the institution of criminal proceedings by information rather
than indictment was not constitutionally offensive.
Additionally, the Munn passage has been cited in one dissenting opinion, Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 454 (1982) (Blackmun, J. dissenting), and in
one concurring opinion, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 92-93 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding New
York state workmen's compensation law which replaced common law damages with statutory
compensation scheme and held an employer strictly liable for most job-related injuries).
92. Id. (recognizing power of state to disallow defenses of contributory negligence, as-
sumption of risk, and "fellow servant rule" in workmen's compensation scheme).
93. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (tacitly recognizing such state
power; "The burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law...").
94. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909) (recognizing the
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statutorily define the elements of recoverable damages,95 or how they are to
be paid,9 6 without running afoul of the seventh amendment. In examining
whether the seventh amendment limits legislative power to alter a common
law form of action solely by the imposition of a damage cap, a review of
other legislation containing damage-limiting provisions is instructive.
The Warsaw Convention, as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement,97
limits recoverable damages for property loss or damage or personal injury on
international air voyages to $75,000; the Price-Anderson Act9" limits recov-
erable damages in the event of an accident at a federally licensed nuclear
power plant to $560,000,000 in the aggregate;99 federal workers' compensa-
tion statutes, such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act,'O° replace common law damages with compensation schemes.' O'
Each has been held to be inoffensive to the seventh amendment.' 2 In each
instance, the court recognized the power of the legislature to limit damages
in such fashion. However, each is distinguishable from legislation which
baldly limits the recovery a plaintiff may enjoy without otherwise altering
the common law nature of the action or the plaintiff's burdens thereunder.
First, each of these statutes or treaties provides the plaintiff a quid pro
quo, 10 3 most often in the form of a reduced burden of proof or a guarantee of
recovery. The Warsaw Convention subjects the air carrier to strict liability
for loss, damage, or injury arising under its provisions. "o Similarly, strict
"undoubted right" of a legislature to create a presumption of bad faith and untruth where a
corporation fails to produce its books, as ordered, in an antitrust action).
95. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (1956) (prohibiting award of damages for
pain and suffering where tort victim dies prior to final adjudication of case).
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (1975) (certain medical malpractice dam-
ages to be paid in the form of structured annuity).
97. Warsaw Convention, supra note 45.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
99. Id. § 2210(c).
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982).
101. Id. §§ 906, 908-909.
102. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (Price-
Anderson Act); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act), overruled on other grounds, Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs v. Perini North River Assoc., 459 U.S. 297 (1983); Pierre v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) (Warsaw Convention).
103. See supra note 46.
104. Warsaw Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 17-18(1). However, the Convention per-
mits two defenses to claims made under its provisions: contributory negligence, id. at art. 21;
and proof by the carrier that all necessary measures were taken to prevent the injury or that it
was unavoidable, id. at art. 20(1). These defenses were abolished by the Montreal Agreement,
supra note 45, and strict liability is now imposed. See infra note 121.
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liability prevails in workers' compensation statutes," 5 and the Price-Ander-
son Act requires the nuclear power plant operator to waive all legal defenses
in the event of a substantial nuclear accident. 10 6
The Supreme Court has never held that a statute which displaces a com-
mon law right of recovery and limits recoverable damages must, in the inter-
est of due process, provide such a quid pro quo.'0 7 Similarly, the Court has
never held that such a quid pro quo is not required. 10 8 Lower courts are
divided on the subject.' 09 Despite the Supreme Court's silence on the ques-
tion, it is sufficient for purposes of this analysis to note that the major dam-
age-limiting statutes all provide such a quid pro quo and are thus
distinguishable from a statute which merely "caps" recoverable damages
while granting no concession to the plaintiff.
Additionally, both the Price-Anderson Act"0 and the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act"' create compensation schemes in
derogation of common law damage remedies. Characteristics of common
law tort actions which have been legislatively abrogated include the plain-
tiff's burden of proving negligence on the part of the tortfeasor, "2 the ability
of the tortfeasor to assert some (or any) common law defenses," 3 the ab-
sence of guaranteed collectability of recovery,' 14 and the absence of limita-
tions upon recoverable damages.' Because such compensation schemes
were unknown to the common law of torts, the courts have viewed them as
forms of action which have sufficiently lost, through extensive legislative
modification, their common law character. This extensive legislative modifi-
cation of common law tort actions has transformed them into creatures of
105. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 904
(1982).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1).
107. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. See State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (re-
jecting necessity of quid pro quo because it is not mandated by decisions of the Supreme
Court); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (holding that due process
does not require quid pro quo and pointing out that, in return for the limitation, the plaintiff is
assured collection of a damage award through the state assurance fund); see also Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (holding that quid pro quo is required under the
state constitution).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2210.
111. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
112. See, e.g., id. § 904(b).
113. See, e.g., id. § 905(a).
114. See, e.g., id. § 904(a).
115. See, e.g., id. § 909.
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statute, to which the seventh amendment does not necessarily apply. 1 6 It
may be said that such legislative modification has gone "far enough" to re-
move these actions from the purview of the seventh amendment." 17
By contrast, the mere imposition of a damage cap does not relieve the
plaintiff of proving every element of his claim as it was known at common
law, nor does it guarantee a recovery where the common law guaranteed
none. Similarly, a damage cap does not limit or eliminate defenses which the
tortfeasor may raise in his behalf. Insofar as damage caps merely limit re-
coverable damages without providing a compensation scheme or other statu-
tory remedy, they bear a greater similarity to the limitations imposed by the
Warsaw Convention,'' 8 as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement.' 9
This appears to suggest a broad legislative empowerment to limit recoverable
damages by the simple imposition of a damage cap.
However, the Warsaw Convention imposes strict liability upon the air car-
rier for loss, damage, or injury. 20 Thus, in addition to placing a limit upon
recoverable damages, it modifies the plaintiff's burden of proving negligence
on the part of the tortfeasor, a common law tort characteristic. 2 ' Further,
the nature of the underlying transaction between the air carrier and the pu-
tative plaintiff differs significantly from that which exists between tortfeasor
and negligently injured plaintiff. The air carrier and passenger or shipper
are in privity of contract either for passage or shipment of goods, 122 whereas
in most instances, a tortfeasor and negligently injured plaintiff are legal
strangers. Medical malpractice claims 123 possess some elements of contract
116. Compare Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
117. Id.
118. Warsaw Convention, supra note 45.
119. Montreal Agreement, supra note 45.
120. See supra note 104.
121. See Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D. N.J. 1957). While not ad-
dressing the requirement, or lack thereof, of a quid pro quo, District Judge Meaney relied
heavily upon the existence of a quid pro quo in upholding the Warsaw Convention against
seventh amendment attack. "A reasonable quid pro quo is provided in the alteration of neces-
sity for proof of negligence as it existed before the acceptance of the Warsaw Convention." Id.
at 489. Pierre is the only case to date which has addressed the Convention's limitation of
damages with respect to the seventh amendment. The original Convention permitted two de-
fenses by the air carrier; however, the Montreal Agreement, supra note 45, modified the Con-
vention to eliminate these defenses. See Doere and Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. l,
1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987); supra note 104.
122. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
123. See Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1383 (5th Cir. 1987) (physician/patient
relationship may be viewed as contractual).
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in the underlying transaction, but virtual necessity causes people to seek
medical treatment in most instances.
In contrast, the underlying transaction which gives rise to a claim gov-
erned by the Warsaw Convention arises from convenience or commercial
expediency. Necessity rarely, if ever, dictates that one travel or ship goods
by international air carrier. To avail itself of the protection of the Conven-
tion, the air carrier must provide, in ten-point type, notice of the damage
limitation on the passenger ticket or bill of lading.' 24 In the context of con-
tract, this notice may be viewed as a disclaimer, which the air passenger or
shipper accepts as a condition of the transaction and which will be enforced
provided the notice is statutorily adequate.' 25 This view suggests a volun-
tary waiver of the plaintiff's right to recovery in excess of the amount pre-
scribed, rather than a broad legislative empowerment to limit recoverable
damages. In contrast to an action under the Warsaw Convention, the plain-
tiff in a common law tort action subject to a legislatively imposed damage
cap does not enjoy the benefit of strict liability, nor does the limitation of
recoverable damages arise from a voluntary waiver of damages in excess of
the limitation.
While not imposing a cap on damages, a second type of statute, commonly
dealing with environmental concerns,"' calls for civil penalties' 27 for viola-
tion of its provisions. Likening such penalties to a criminal fine, the
Supreme Court has held that assessment of the amount of such penalty is not
a fundamental incident of trial by jury and that Congress may authorize
determination of the amount of such penalty by the court.'28
B. Procedural Devices
Assuming that legislatures may properly enact damage caps without run-
ning afoul of the seventh amendment, a question necessarily arises as to the
124. Montreal Agreement, supra note 45.
125. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 91 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
126. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
127. Id. at § 1319(d). While a civil penalty is statutory in nature and conceptually differ-
ent from common law damages, the Supreme Court has given what is possibly an indication
that it may find, in a proper case, that determination of damages by a jury is not mandated by
the seventh amendment. "We have been presented with no evidence that the Framers meant
to extend the right to a jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial." Tull v. United States, 481
U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987). The Court, however, cites no authority in support of this premise
and gives no indication as to how it might be reconciled with its earlier pronouncements in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). For the moment, this question remains open and
any attempt to extend the reasoning of Tull to arguments concerning common law damages is
speculative.
128. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (citing Atcheson v. Everett, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1775)).
19891
Catholic University Law Review
means used to apply the caps. Either the jury is instructed that it may find
damages only up to the amount of the limitation, or the jury is left free to
find damages in any amount, but the damages are then reduced by the court
to comply with the cap.' 29 The first approach is self-contradictory. It con-
cedes that determination of the quantum of damages is a factual issue to be
decided by the jury, then denies this view by impeding the jury from fully
deciding the question. Apart from the inherent self-contradiction, such di-
rect limitation of the jury's function runs contrary to existing seventh
amendment jurisprudence. 130 As such, a direct limitation on the jury's deter-
mination presents an undesirable approach to containing damage awards
within statutory limitations.
The alternative is to leave the jury free to reach a determination of dam-
ages and, if excessive, to judicially reduce the amount to comply with the
statutory limitation by use of some procedural device. Various procedural
devices already exist which permit a court to alter a damage award, decide
the award itself, or remove it altogether from the consideration of the jury.
These devices may be viewed as supporting a broad legislative empowerment
to cap damage awards. The fact that the jury need not determine the quan-
tum of damages in common law actions in all instances arguably supports
the premise that a legislature may enact a damage cap without offending the
seventh amendment. A closer analysis, however, demonstrates that the
existence of these procedural devices does not support such a broad view of
legislative power.
1. Remittitur
Remittitur is a device whereby a court, in the face of a defendant's motion
for a new trial, may require a plaintiff to "remit" a portion of a favorable
verdict in return for denial of the defendant's motion.31 As first announced
by Justice Story,' 32 a plaintiff's remission of that portion of a verdict deemed
by the court to be excessive may be imposed as a condition of denying a
defendant's motion for a new trial and proper determination of the quantum
129. A third alternative, the Louisiana practice of having the court assess the quantum of
damages, was expressly rejected as contrary to the seventh amendment when sought to be
applied in a diversity of citizenship case. Gillen v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 147, 150-52
(5th Cir. 1952); see also Chatzicharalambus v. Petit, 73 F.R.D. 417 (E.D. La. 1977).
130. See Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The right
of a plaintiff to have this fact issue [of damages] decided by a jury devolves from the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution .... ); see also Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316,
320-21 (1885) (without a waiver of seventh amendment right, the court errs if it substitutes
itself for the jury in determination of factual issues).
131. See Dirnick, 293 U.S. at 476.
132. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
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of damages by a new jury.'3 3 Over a century later, the Supreme Court ques-
tioned whether this practice denied a litigant's right to a jury trial'3 4 and
whether there is sound historical basis for the practice so as to incorporate it
within the seventh amendment as part of the common law of England as it
existed in 1791. ' Notwithstanding its doubts, the Court in Dimick v.
Schiedt 136 stated in dictum that the practice would not be disturbed largely
because it had been part of federal jurisprudence for over one hundred years
at the time the Court considered it.' 3 7 Thus, remittitur does not violate the
seventh amendment.
Remittitur, however, is proper only where a jury verdict "is palpably and
grossly ... excessive."' 31 Under this standard, the verdict must be so con-
trary to or unsupported by the evidence as to indicate passion on the part of
the jury in reaching the verdict;' 3 9 it must be unconscionable."4 Moreover,
the court is without power to enter a judgment for a lesser amount absent
the plaintiff's consent to remit.'
4 1
Thus, it is not presently within the courts' inherent power over judgments
to apply remittitur where evidence supports a jury verdict. Remittitur rests
upon the evidence peculiar to the individual case before the court and exists
as a means of providing post-judgment relief from an excessive award ren-
dered by a runaway jury. Therefore, the court's reduction of an excessive
verdict to comport with a statutory limitation, where the verdict is otherwise
reasonable and supported by the evidence, is without procedural precedent
under the doctrine of remittitur.
To use remittitur as a means of reducing a verdict for a public policy
purpose, such as caps on damages, would require an expansion of the doc-
trine. In addition to requiring the court to reduce an otherwise proper dam-
age award, the use of remittitur would require the court to apply remittitur
absent the consent of the plaintiff. This practice is without precedent. The
Supreme Court has indicated that, based upon the questionable inclusion of
the doctrine in federal jurisprudence, such expansion of the doctrine of re-
mittitur is not to be considered.
142
133. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
134. Dim ick, 293 U.S. at 484.
135. Id. at 476.
136. Id. at 474.
137. Id. at 484.
138. Id. at 486.
139. See Goldstein v. Manhattan Indust., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1447-48 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
140. See Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 716 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 1983).
141. Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F.2d 3, 8 (2d Cir. 1925).
142. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 474:
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2. Default Judgment
Unlike remittitur, the device of default judgment leaves determination of
the quantum of damages to the court without intervention of a jury in some
instances. 143 The existence of default judgment suggests that determination
of the amount of damages is not an inherent jury function or, at least, that
this determination may, in some instances, be removed from the jury's con-
sideration. As presently known, default judgment applies only where a de-
fendant fails to appear and defend,"' or as a punitive measure where a
defendant fails to make or cooperate in discovery.' 45 In the absence of de-
nial of a plaintiff's allegations, no disputed question of fact can be presented
to a jury, at least as to the defendant's liability. 146 The plaintiff's allegations
are construed as having been admitted.' 47 Where the damages sued upon
are for a sum certain or for an amount that may be made certain by compu-
tation, the clerk may enter judgment in that amount.148 In all other cases,
only the court may enter judgment, after it determines the amount of the
plaintiff's damages. "' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides that the
court "shall accord the right of trial by jury to the parties when and as re-
quired by any statute of the United States."' 5 ° The rule provides no other
guidance concerning the question of a plaintiff's right to a jury determina-
tion of damages in such a situation. The few cases which address the ques-
tion of default judgment in relation to a litigant's right to trial by jury have
done so from the perspective of the defaulting defendant, finding no depriva-
tion of that right.' 5 '
Nevertheless, this court in a very special sense is charged with the duty of construing
and upholding the Constitution; and in the discharge of that important duty, it ever
must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere analogy to a
different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert what it conceives to be a
principle of the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 485.
143. See generally Raymond v. Danbury & N.R. Co., 20 F. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Conn. 1877)
(No. 11,593).
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Analytically, a defendant may be deemed in default,
despite the fact that he has appeared in the action, if he has failed to participate in the litigation
in any meaningful manner. See, e.g., Randolph v. Barrett, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 138, 142 (1842)
(default judgment proper where defendant failed to proceed following unsuccessful plea in
abatement). Entry of default judgment under Rule 37 is the most severe of the discovery
sanctions and may only be resorted to when the errant defendant has disobeyed a court order
compelling discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
146. See Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949).
147. See Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
149. Id. 55(b)(2).
150. Id.
151. See Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949);
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Case authority exists for the proposition that, where an action is brought
for a sum certain or a liquidated debt, judgment may be entered without the
intervention of a jury without offending the seventh amendment.152 Where,
however, as in a tort action, damages are not readily ascertainable, no au-
thority exists that speaks to the existence or nonexistence of a plaintiff's
absolute right to a jury determination of damages. The existence of such an
undeclared right would comport with the common law of 1791153 and would
create no seventh amendment problem. Should the courts find in future de-
cisions that the seventh amendment does not encompass such a right, the
finding would be in derogation of the common law of England as it existed at
the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment. Such a finding would
indicate either the courts' belief that this element of the English common law
was not intended to be adopted as part and parcel of the seventh amend-
ment, or a belief that courts, and possibly legislatures, may properly modify
common law rights which are constitutionally preserved.
While no authority exists for the premise that the seventh amendment
provides plaintiffs the right to a jury assessment of unliquidated damages
where a defendant defaults, the federal courts of appeal have found that the
right to a jury determination of unliquidated damages, as a general matter, is
constitutionally required.' 54 Conversely, the Supreme Court has held in one
instance that declared rights preserved under the seventh amendment may
be legislatively modified.' 5 5 This supports the "broad empowerment" posi-
tion advocated by proponents of damage caps.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902); Raymond v. Danbury & N.R.
Co., 20 F. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Conn. 1877) (No. 11,593); see also Cropley v. Vogeler, 2 App.
D.C. 28 (1893).
152. See King v. United Beneficial Fire Ins. Co., 377 F.2d 728, 730-31 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967); E.C. Gerhard Bldg. Co. v. Dallas, 298 F. 264, 267-68 (5th Cir.
1924).
153. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *397.
154. See Korbut v. Keystone Shipping Co., 380 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1967) (violation of
the seventh amendment for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury where the
jurors could not agree on the amount of damages); Gillen v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 198 F.2d
147, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1952) (substantive state law providing for judicial assessment of damages
in personal injury actions held not binding upon the federal courts); E.C. Gerhard, 298 F. at
268 ("It is only where an action is brought for a sum certain, or which can be rendered certain
by computation, that judgment for damages may be entered by the court without a jury under
the Seventh Amendment."). But see Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964)
(no seventh amendment requirement of jury trial in claims for punitive damages or attorney's
fees), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965).
155. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). The Colgrove court held that a jury of six in
a civil action is not offensive to the seventh amendment. Id. at 160. The Court had previously
stated that the seventh amendment requires a jury of 12. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
586 (1900), overruled on other grounds, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).
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3. Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and
Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide for the devices of di-
rected verdict,' 5 6 judgment notwithstanding the verdict,' 57 and summary
judgment. 5 8 These devices serve in some instances to remove the question
of damages from the jury's consideration or to permit the court to disregard
the jury's determination. Such devices, however, differ conceptually from
recognition of a judicial or legislative power to determine the quantum of
recoverable damages and go only to the sufficiency of evidence required to
submit an issue to the jury.' 59 Where the court directs a verdict or enters
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it has determined as a matter of law
that the litigant bearing the burden of proof has failed to do so' 6 ° or, if the
moving party bears the burden of proof, that that party has done so in such
overwhelming fashion as to preclude any defense to the evidence
presented. 16 ' Thus, the court withdraws from the jury not the question of
the quantum of damages, but the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to recover any damages, or a particular element of damages, at all.
Summary judgment, while conceptually similar to directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, does not go to the sufficiency of a
plaintiff's evidence, but presupposes that there are no controverted questions
of fact for jury resolution. 162 Unlike a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, summary judgment looks to the questions of
law presented. ' 63 When, after eliminating the points upon which the parties
are in agreement, a disputed issue is reduced to one or more questions of
law, no factual questions remain which require jury determination. 64
While any ties these devices may have to the common law of 1791 are
questionable at best, common law at that time did recognize the principle
that an issue may be withdrawn from a jury's consideration by the use of
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
157. See id. 50(b)-(d).
158. See id. 56.
159. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943) (directed verdict); Mattivi v.
South African Marine Corp., "Huguenot," 618 F.2d 163, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1980) (judgment
notwithstanding the verdict).
160. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1985); Rochester Civic Theater, Inc. v. Ramsay, 368 F.2d 748, 752
(8th Cir. 1966).
161. See Service Auto Supply Co. v. Harte & Co., 533 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1976).
162. See Whitsell v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 47, 48 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956).
163. See EEOC v. May & Co., 572 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
164. Id.
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demurrer. 165 Proponents of tort reform may be heartened by the form, if
not the substance, of the Supreme Court's decision in Galloway v. United
States, 166 insofar as it lends recognition to the new device of directed verdict
in derogation of the common law. This recognition would imply the propri-
ety of introducing a new procedural device whereby damages awarded by a
jury in excess of a statutory limitation may be reduced. It must be recog-
nized, however, that the "novation" of directed verdict is procedural in na-
ture, a substitute for the antiquated device of demurrer, and thus not
necessarily preserved by the seventh amendment.'6 7 The adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 16 concurrently with the adoption
of the directed verdict, effectively abolished the common law device of de-
murrer. 169 Moreover, the demurrer and directed verdict are similar in appli-
cation and effect, affording a litigant no greater or lesser rights than were
afforded under the common law of England as it existed in 1791.
In sum, remittitur, directed verdict, summary judgment, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and default judgment, as these devices presently
exist, do not provide a vehicle for judicial reduction of a jury award in excess
of a statutory limitation.'17  Nor do any of these devices permit removal of
the question of the quantum of damages in a common law action from the
jury's consideration. 17 ' These results can only be accomplished through the
creation of a new procedural device or the unprecedented expansion of an
existing one, assuming that limitation of damages is not to be accomplished
by directly limiting the deliberations of the jury with regard to the damage
question. 1
72
IV. Is THERE SUBSTANCE TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT?
As with direct limitations upon the deliberative function of the jury, it is
self-contradictory to permit a court to accept only that part of a damage
award which comports with a statutory limitation. Both means of limiting
damages simultaneously affirm and deny the function of the jury as trier of
fact. Assuming, however, that legislatures may properly enact statutes that
baldly limit recoverable damages in a common law action, and presuming
165. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 394-97 (1943) (likening directed verdict
to common law demurrer).
166. Id.
167. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 305-06 (1920); see also Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c).
169. Id. 50(a).
170. See supra notes 131-69 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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further that some procedural device may be created or expanded to imple-
ment damage caps without offending the seventh amendment, the most
troubling concern of all arises. If a legislature may so remove the damage
issue from the purview of the jury, then, what, if any, substantive rights are
preserved from the reach of legislatures by the seventh amendment?
The Supreme Court speaks in resplendent terms when addressing the sig-
nificance of the seventh amendment to our constitutional form of govern-
ment. 17 3 In practice, however, the Court has continued to limit the seventh
amendment's application in individual circumstances, 174 asserting that the
seventh amendment preserves only the bare substance of the right to trial by
jury. 175 In distinguishing such individual circumstances from its own elu-
sive concept of the core of rights preserved by the seventh amendment, the
Court has succeeded in identifying only certain instances which fall within
or without the scope of seventh amendment protection. 176 It has not, how-
ever, defined the scope of this protection.
Similarly, the Court has not demarcated a clear line between matters of
substance, which the seventh amendment may protect, and matters of proce-
dure, which are not protected. Nor has the Court indicated upon which side
of this line jury determination of a plaintiff's damages falls. The Court has
never addressed the issue in specific terms, holding only that the seventh
amendment commands unanimity of verdict, 177 submission of questions of
173. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91.
175. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920):
The command of the Seventh Amendment that the "right to trial by jury shall be
preserved" does not require that old forms of practice and procedure be retained. It
does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for determining what facts are
actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction of new rules of evidence.
Changes in these may be made. New devices may be used to adapt the ancient insti-
tution to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration
of justice. Indeed such changes are essential to the preservation of the right. The
limitation imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial
by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the
jury be not interfered with.
Id. at 309-10 (citations & footnote omitted); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction of Seventh Amendment's
Guaranty of Right to Trial by Jury, 40 L. Ed. 2d 846, 855-59 (1974).
177. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897); see also Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952) overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900), overruled on other
grounds, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346-47
(1898), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Springville v.
Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897).
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fact to a jury, 7 8 and the present requirement of six jurors in a civil action. '79
It is difficult to characterize either the existence or extent of a plaintiff's
unliquidated injuries as anything other than questions of fact which must be
submitted to a jury. The proponents of damage-limiting statutory provisions
do not argue that the assessment of damages should be removed entirely
from the province of the jury. Instead, they urge that limitations be placed
on the jury's discretion in this regard. Yet at least one court 8 ° has held that
"[t]he measuring of damages by a jury ...would seem to be a matter of
practice rather than of right."''
The prevailing view among the federal circuits considering the question is
that the determination of the quantum of damages in a common law action
is uniquely a jury function.' 82 The Supreme Court has implied likewise.' 83
Moreover, the practice of submitting the assessment of damages to a jury
was well-entrenched in the common law of England at the time the seventh
amendment was adopted.' 84 The idea that a jury might determine damages
only within legislatively prescribed boundaries was as alien to the common
law as the notion that a court might reject any part of a jury verdict sup-
ported by the evidence.'18  If it is possible to reconcile legislative power to
enact bald damage caps in common law forms of action with the common
178. Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 321 (1885) (stating that trial of issues of
fact without the intervention of a jury is permissible only where the parties waive their right to
jury trial); see also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) ("It was the province of the
jury to pass upon the issues of fact, and the right of the defendants to have this done is secured
by the Constitution of the United States.").
179. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973) (criticizing Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), which stated that the seventh amendment requires a jury of 12); see
also supra note 155.
180. "In an application of pure legal reasoning, untainted by citation to the precedents
.... .Grinder v. Bryans Road Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687, 690, 432 A.2d 453, 455
(1981) (Rodowsky, J.).
181. Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486, 488 (D.N.J. 1957).
182. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
183. In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the Court noted:
The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury is that
the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine the facts. ...
Where the verdict returned by a jury is grossly and palpably excessive, it should not
be permitted to stand; but in that event, both parties remain entitled, as they were
entitled in the first instance, to have a jury properly determine the question of liabil-
ity and the extent of the injury by an assessment of damages. Both are questions of
fact.
Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 152-53. Contrary to District Judge Meaney's
analysis in Pierre, under the common law as it was known to Blackstone, a jury was required
by writ of enquiry to assess unliquidated damages even where a judgment of default was en-
tered. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *397-98; see also supra note 121.
185. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *397-98.
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law right to jury trial preserved by the seventh amendment, this reconcilia-
tion can only rest on the premise that determination of the quantum of dam-
ages is not an element of the common law jury trial that is preserved by the
seventh amendment. Yet no mention of such an exclusion appears either in
the wording of the amendment or in the history surrounding its adoption.
According to some Supreme Court Justices, the seventh amendment has
been subject to an alarming degree of judicial erosion.' 86 Implementation of
the directed verdict,' 87 the six-person jury, 88 offensive use of collateral es-
toppel regarding issues that a defendant had no opportunity to present to a
jury, ' and judicial determination of civil penalties 9° have each been seen
as eroding the seventh amendment guarantee of a right to trial by jury. Re-
gardless of whether such practices constitute the pernicious threat to the
seventh amendment that these Justices perceive, it is clear that the trend
over the past fifty years has been to diminish the role of the jury in civil
actions. This has been done, in some instances, in the name of judicial econ-
omy.191 Jury trials are inefficient, expensive, time-consuming, and cumber-
some. 192  However, the legislative history surrounding passage of the
seventh amendment indicates that economy was not the motivating force
behind the framers' insistence upon civil trial by jury, but rather that the
framers recognized its inefficiency and nevertheless tenaciously insisted upon
its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 9'
Practices sanctioned by these and other Supreme Court decisions have
eroded the substantive rights preserved by the seventh amendment to their
present minimal level. The Court's decisions in Galloway v. United States 194
and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore' 95 create or sanction exceptions to the
function of the jury regarding the question of a defendant's liability to the
injured plaintiff. Furthermore, the Court's decision in Colgrove v. Battin, 196
which lends judicial sanction to legislative alteration of previously declared
186. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (Scalia, Stevens, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (Marshall, Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ.,
dissenting); see also Wolfram, supra note 60.
187. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 337 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190. Tull, 481 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 181-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. See Wolfram, supra note 60, at 671.
193. See supra text accompanying note 69.
194. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
195. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
196. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
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seventh amendment rights, suggests authority for continued abrogation of
the jury function. This trend indicates a likelihood that should the Supreme
Court ever rule upon the constitutionality of statutes which merely limit re-
coverable damages in common law actions, the seventh amendment would
be afforded little reverence.' 97
If the seventh amendment's road to hell is paved with good intentions, as
the saying goes, the legislative good intention of assuring affordable and
available insurance and access to necessary medical services by imposing
damage caps' 98 marks yet another milestone. If the courts legitimize legisla-
tive power to enact such caps, notwithstanding the seventh amendment, the
gravity of the threat posed to seventh amendment guarantees becomes
clearly evident only when one observes that a common law cause of action
presents just two broad questions for the jury's determination: whether the
defendant caused a legal injury to the plaintiff for which he may recover,
and, if so, the extent of the injury to be compensated. 99 Notwithstanding
their honorable purpose, damage caps serve only to undermine the function
of the jury with regard to the second question. Damage caps reduce the
litigant's constitutional entitlement from one commanding that a jury reach
a unanimous verdict on both the questions of liability and damages, to one
requiring that a jury reach a unanimous verdict on the question of liability
alone. Under this scheme, the jury reaches the question of damages only if
not pre-empted by legislative fiat from doing so. If jury determination of the
quantum of the plaintiff's unliquidated damages may be so limited, jury de-
termination of the damage question shrinks to a mere practice rather than a
constitutional entitlement. Most troubling of all is the thought that a statute
can reduce a constitutional entitlement to the level of a mere practice. The
Constitution quite clearly spells out the means for amending it. 2" Simple
legislation is not one of those means.
V. CONCLUSION
Assuming the genuineness of the alleged insurance crisis, the threat posed
by curtailment of essential services is indeed worthy of legislative attention.
However, the power of a legislature to preempt the function of a jury on the
question of damages cannot be squared with any fair reading of the history
and purpose of the seventh amendment. Apart from those provisions con-
197. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987) (Possibly foreshadowing such
treatment by stating: "We have been presented with no evidence that the Framers meant to
extend the right to a jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial.").
198. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
199. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
200. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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cerning "housekeeping," constitutional provisions either grant or limit pow-
ers of government. If the framers did not intend the seventh amendment to
serve as a check upon the government's power to interfere with a litigant's
right to a jury trial, it is incomprehensible that the provision was given the
exalted status of a constitutional amendment when the framers could have
enacted it as a mere procedural statute. If the framers did not intend for the
seventh amendment to extend to the damage determination phase of an ac-
tion, it is only slightly less incomprehensible that this argument has not been
raised for almost 200 years. Nothing in the underlying history of the sev-
enth amendment indicates that it was not intended to extend to the damage
phase of common law actions. On the contrary, the essential function of the
jury in determining the quantum of a plaintiff's damages was deeply en-
trenched in English common law - the touchstone of the seventh amend-
ment - at the time of its adoption. Absent constitutional amendment, the
seventh amendment cannot coexist with broad legislative empowerment to
alter common law forms of action by the mere imposition of damage caps.
Acquiescence by the courts in legislative attempts to impose damage caps
would serve only to limit and erode seventh amendment protections. Judi-
cial recognition of an inherent power of legislatures to dictate the result a
jury must reach, even in only a few specific instances, would be a radical
departure from traditional seventh amendment jurisprudence. Judicial cog-
nizance of a new procedural means, or the expansion of an existing means, to
effectuate such an end would be equally unprincipled. A judicial charade
which purports to send the question of damages to the jury, only to have the
court reduce the jury's determination in order to comport with a statutory
limitation, undermines not only the seventh amendment, but the credibility
of the courts and legislatures as well. The courts should neither condone nor
tolerate legislative attempts to create such a means of effectuating damage
caps.
If the general welfare demands that damage awards in common law forms
of action be limited in order to stem the curtailment of insurance and health
services, the persons to make that decision are not the judges or the legisla-
tors, but the people of the states, at whose insistence the seventh amendment
became part of the Constitution. Unless and until the people are persuaded
to modify or repeal the seventh amendment, the courts should be watchful to
preserve what substance remains of it and to assure that it stands, as in-
tended, as a direct limitation upon unbridled legislative power.
Granting, for the sake of argument, the existence and social necessity of
dealing with the present insurance crisis and the necessity or desirability of
some aspects of tort reform, where the imposition of damage-limiting provi-
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sions is concerned, the ends cannot justify the means. While the end of as-
suring the availability of affordable insurance to those who provide valuable
services to society is desirable, if not necessary, this means of doing so is
constitutionally infirm. The only manner in which the power of legislatures
to enact such legislation may be legitimized is by undermining and eroding
seventh amendment guarantees. If the courts permit this, the implications
are grave. If one provision of the Constitution may be disregarded or sub-
verted for purposes of social expediency, so might any provision, with the
result that, while the Constitution remains the supreme law of the land, it
does so only so far as legislative perception of social desirability permits.
This is unacceptable, intolerable, and repugnant to the concept of constitu-
tional government. Whether or not there is substance to the seventh amend-
ment will depend upon how the courts address this issue in the months and
years to come.2 ° '
Paul B. Weiss
201. Postscript: Marking the first time the highest court of any state has invalidated a
damage cap based upon the considerations addressed herein, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton recently declared that state's cap on noneconomic damages unconstitutional as violative of
the civil jury trial provision contained in the state constitution. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,
112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
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